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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Major Crimes Act
In Kansas v. Mitchell, 642 P.2d 981 (Kan. 1982), appellant
Mitchell, an American Indian, had been convicted by a jury in
state court of second degree murder for an offense against
another Indian within Indian country. Mitchell made an untimely
appeal because of lack of information about his appellate rights,
challenging Kansas' jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Appellant argued that the Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1981 Supp.) confers exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
Indian defendant charged with killing another Indian within
Indian country. Kansas argued that the state had concurrent
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3243.
The court reviewed the circumstances of Mitchell's attempted
appeal and found that he was improperly and inadequately informed of his appellate rights. These special circumstances warranted waiver of the statute of limitations and allowed the court
to reach the merits. After discussion about the legislative history
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 3243, the court found that even though
Kansas, like a few other states, was given concurrent jurisdiction
over some offenses committed by or against Indians within Indian country, Congress specifically intended to reserve exclusive
federal jurisdiction over the major crimes as defined in the
Federal Major Crimes Act. The court held that under sections
3243 and 1153, Kansas exceeded its jurisdiction by trying Mitchell
for the alleged murder of another Indian in Indian country. The
action against Mitchell is dismissed.
LEASING MINERAL RIGHTS
In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982), nonIndian lessees who produced oil and gas from within the tribe's
reservation pursuant to leases granted them under the auspices of
the Secretary of the Interior brought two suits, consolidated for
trial, against the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and its tribal council seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction that would prohibit
enforcement of the tribe's oil and gas severance tax to be
measured by the production from oil and gas wells within the
reservation. The United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico declared the tax illegal, and the tribe appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion,
held that an Indian tribe has inherent power to impose a
severance tax on production by non-Indians of oil and gas on
tribal land. Even if the tribe's authority to tax non-Indians is
derived solely from its power to exclude non-Indians from the
reservation, a tribe may still impose a severance tax on nonIndians who have a right of entry pursuant to lease contracts with
the tribe because non-Indians remain subject to a tribe's lesserincluded power to tax or place other conditions on their conduct
or continued presence on the reservation. The Court further
stated that Congress has not, by establishing national energy
policies or by enacting statutes governing leasing of oil and gas
interests on tribal lands and permitting state taxation of mineral
lessees on certain reservations, preempted tribal taxation on
severance of minerals when both the taxing ordinance and the
tribal constitution have received approval by the Secretary of the
Interior. Finally, the Court held that a tribe's enactment of a
severance tax pursuant to a scheme established by Congress
precludes judicial review of a tribe's taxing power under the commerce clause.
In UnitedNuclear Corporationv. Watt, No. 81-1537(D.D.C.May
21, 1982), United Nuclear Corporation obtained two uranium exploration and mining leases from the Navajo Tribe in 1971, which
were approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by 25
U.S.C. § 36A. UNC then submitted a mining plan directly to the
Secretary for approval pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 177.7 (1981). The
Secretary, however, refused acceptance of the plan because the
tribe had not given its approval, though such tribal acceptance is
apparently not required. UNC sought, inter alia, an equitable extension of its leases to compensate for the delay in approval of its
mining plan. Defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19(b): failure to join an indispensable party, i.e.,
the Navajo Tribe. The court found that the Secretary is not the
lessor and that his status as tribal trustee and guardian only permits him to veto leases; he may not require that a lease be
granted. Because the Secretary lacks authority to lease, he also
lacks authority to extend an expired lease. Therefore, a court cannot consider extension of the leases without joining the tribe as a
necessary and indispensable party. UNC was granted leave to join
the tribe, although the suit could still be subject to a sovereign
immunity challenge.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss2/7

1981]

FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND EASEMENTS:

Power Lines

In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., No. 80-841-M Civ. (D.N.M. June 2, 1982), the Pueblo
of Santa Ana sought damages from the defendant telephone company for trespass from 1907 to the present, caused by the construction of telegraph and telephone lines over lands held in fee
simple by the Pueblo but subject to federal restraints against
alienation. The Secretary of the Interior had approved the rightof-way grant in 1928 pursuant to section A of the Pueblo Lands
Act (P.L.A.). Plaintiffs contended that he acted without the
proper authority in doing so. After reviewing the legislative history of the P.L.A., the court concluded that the congressional intent in passing the Act was to extend the protections of the NonIntercourse Act to the Pueblos, including the provisions against
alienation of lands without clear and express congressional
authority. The court held that the Secretary had no such authority either through congressional delegation or pursuant to the
P.L.A., and the right-of-way grant was therefore invalid.
Defendant argued that the Pueblo was barred from raising the
trespass issue by the judgment in United States v. Brown,' which
was a quiet title action brought by the United States on behalf of
the Pueblo. Before any trial, the case against the telephone company was dismissed on the ground that the company had obtained
a valid right-of-way. Defendant asserted that the Pueblo was collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue. The court held that
"for collateral estoppel to apply, the factual issue must have been
actually litigated and necessarily decided." In Brown, no such determination on the merits was ever reached; therefore, the Pueblo
was not barred from bringing this suit.
TRUST AND RESTRICTED LANDS:

Conveyance

In Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v.
Hallett, 540 F. Supp. (D.S.D. 1982), Richard Tall, an Oglala tribal
member, applied to the BIA for fee patents on three allotments
held by him. The application was denied by the Superintendent of
the Pine Ridge Agency on the basis of a tribal ordinance prohibiting alienation of trust lands without tribal approval, which Tall

1. No. 1814 Equity (D.N.M. 1928).
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had not attempted to obtain. Tall appealed the Superintendent's
denial to the Aberdeen Area Director, who reversed the Superintendent and approved the fee patent application. The tribe then
appealed the Area Director's decision through the Department of
the Interior's administrative proceedings. In the final administrative decision, the Board of Indian Appeals upheld the approval of Tall's application.
The tribe brought this suit in the federal district court to halt
issuance of Tall's fee patent until he has applied for tribal approval. The court held that since the tribe is within the coverage
of the Indian Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.),
there is direct statutory authority for the Secretary of the Interior
to grant fee patents in his discretion. The court found no authority that any tribe possesses the power to initially pass on a decision
statutorily committed to the Secretary's discretion.
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